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This article discusses the Lebanese 
activist and writer Bassem Chit as an 
example of the intellectual rebel in 
Lebanon and the Arab world. It analyses 
the ideological tradition of revolutionary 
socialism and the Arab left. Through 
an analysis of interviews and articles, 
Haugbolle attempts to locate the place 
and nature of intellectual production in 
the organisation of revolutionary activity, 
and the particular role rebel intellectuals 
play in bringing about social change. It 
draws on the sociology of intellectuals, 
in particular Gramsci, in the analysis of 
Bassam Chit’s work and his post mortem 
veneration. 
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During the 2015 social protests against 
Lebanon’s political elite, I have often read 
on Facebook threads laments such as, 
“what would Bassem have said?” and “we 
miss your voice, Bassem.” They refer to 
Bassem Chit, the Lebanese revolutionary 
socialist, writer and activist who died from 
a heart attack on October 1, 2014. For a 
limited circle of Lebanese, Arab and inter-
national revolutionary socialists, Bassem 
Chit is a rebel martyr, whose life and work 
continue to inspire. He died at the tender 
age of 34 after a life devoted to renewing 
Marxism and revolutionary socialism. His 
friends and comrades now miss his voice 
and his sharp analysis more than ever, at a 
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time when they feel that a chink in the 
armour of the social system in Lebanon 
may have opened. They also miss his com-
pany and particularly his presence in the 
protests and in the organisation of the 
ḥirāk (“movement”).
The life and death of Bassem Chit accentu-
ate the challenges of organising dissent 
and formulating alternative ideological 
directions, which have come to the fore in 
Lebanon’s trash protests. In this brief arti-
cle, I discuss Bassem Chit as an example 
of the intellectual rebel in Lebanon and 
the Arab world. I analyse the ideological 
tradition of revolutionary socialism and 
the tradition of the Arab left in which his 
work inscribes itself. I am interested in 
understanding the place and nature of 
intellectual production in the organisation 
of revolutionary activity, and the particular 
role rebel intellectuals play in bringing 
about social change. I draw on sociology 
of intellectuals, in particular Gramsci, in 
my analysis of Bassem Chit’s work and the 
veneration of him postmortem.
In order to place myself firmly in this anal-
ysis, I should make it clear that I was a 
friend of Bassem’s. In 2012 and 2013 I 
recorded several interviews with him in 
Beirut, which I use here in addition to his 
writings to place him in the leftist land-
scape of thought and action. Finally, I 
analyse his significance for Lebanese, 
Arab and international revolutionary 
socialism through a reading of obituaries 
as well as the fifth issue of the journal he 
helped founding, al-thawra al-dāʾima, 
which is dedicated to his memory.
Rebel Intellectuals and Arab Marxism
The “rebel intellectual” is somewhat of a 
tautology, as many sociologists see intel-
lectuals as inherently rebellious agents of 
social change in the modern era. More-
over, many intellectuals themselves define 
rebellious change as their credo. The intel-
lectual, Vaclav Havel (167) has written, 
should constantly disturb, should bear 
witness to the misery of the world, 
should be provocative by being inde-
pendent, should rebel against all hid-
den and open pressure and manipula-
tions, should be the chief doubter of 
systems, of power and its incantations, 
should be a witness to their mendacity.
An intellectual who is not rebellious isn’t a 
true intellectual. This ideal certainly 
excludes many self-styled intellectuals, 
who uphold the powers that be. It also 
runs counter to Gramsci’s (97n) broad def-
inition of an intellectual as “the entire 
social stratum, which exercises an organ-
isational function in the wide sense – 
whether in the field of production, or in 
that of culture, or in that of political admin-
istration.” Conversely, Havel’s definition 
would seem to celebrate the critical intel-
lectual who writes against the grain and 
speaks, as Edward Said would have it, 
truth to power. Power, of course, can be 
located not just in the State but in all hege-
monic structures, including institutions 
that pride themselves on being anti-hege-
monic, such as the Eastern European com-
munist parties, which Havel had in mind 
when he wrote his text in 1986, or the self-
styled mumānaʿa (“rejectionism”) of the 
Syrian regime today. For the same reason, 
Karl Mannheim thought that critical intel-
lectuals together must form a free-floating 
intelligentsia, a relatively classless stratum 
of thinkers, able to see beyond the ideo-
logical blinders imposed by the left and 
the right, and thus uphold a democratic, 
critical conversation.
Bassem Chit was rooted in a different 
intellectual tradition, that of international 
and Arab Marxism. The Lebanese Marxists 
that he read and knew generally hold dear 
the Gramscian ideal of the organic intel-
lectual, the ibn al-balad (‘son of the soil’) 
who speaks for the subjugated classes. 
According to Gramsci (5), every social 
group creates organically ‘one or more 
strata of intellectuals which give it homo-
geneity and an awareness of its own func-
tion not only in the economic but also in 
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the social and political fields.’ The trouble 
in the Middle East is that in reality, very few 
of the coryphées of, for example, Leba-
nese Marxism, including the founders of 
the Lebanese Communist Party, have 
hailed from a working-class or peasant-
class background. Despite their middle-
class pedigree (or perhaps because of it), 
they hold on to the idea that they repre-
sent the perspective of the poor and the 
needy. Therefore, instead of taking their 
claims to organic status at face value, we 
must locate intellectuals in their social set-
ting. In order to do that, grand theory must 
be complemented by careful, local histo-
ries. As Gramsci (18-20) himself was well 
aware, intellectuals serve different func-
tions in different political economies and 
cultural contexts. The nature of hegemony 
must be located before a successful analy-
sis of intellectuals can be made. In this 
article, I seek to do so by outlining the 
intellectual tradition and the social milieu 
that Bassem was a product of and in which 
he inscribed his work.
Bassem certainly loved Gramsci, but not 
as much as he loved—and had read—Marx. 
He would pepper his speech and writings 
with citations from Marx, and he was well 
versed in the Arab Marxist tradition. This 
tradition arguably stretches back to the 
debate between Islamic reformers and so-
called materialists in the Nahda period 
(Rodinson 337-48; Tibi 7-17). Historical 
materialism laid the ground for socialist 
visions of development and indepen-
dence. Within the larger spectrum of 
socialism, which also included Salama 
Musa’s Fabianism, Arab Marxism was from 
the beginning a strictly intellectual tradi-
tion of writers and publishers who became 
enthralled with the Bolshevik revolution 
and in the early 1920s established com-
munist parties in Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, 
Sudan, Iraq and Palestine. The path of rev-
olution in the age of the Comintern was 
set and defined by the rigours of Marxist-
Leninist dogma as imposed by Stalin, as 
the Arab communist peers discovered 
when they became enrolled in training 
and ideological regimentation. For 
decades, the overall ideological and polit-
ical authority of the Soviet Communist 
Party meant that Arab communists strug-
gled to develop the Marxist system of 
thought into a flexible methodology that 
might help them understand the realities 
and differing conditions of their own 
countries (Sharif).
In reaction to Stalinism and the domina-
tion of the Communist Party of Syria and 
Lebanon by Khaled Bakdash, a group of 
Lebanese, Palestinian and Syrian intellec-
tuals inspired by the British ‘new left’ of the 
late 1950s wrote critically against the party, 
against Moscow, and against the Arab 
socialism of Nasser and the Baath Party. 
This group included people who were 
influenced by Trotsky and the so-called 
Fourth International. Traces of Trotskysm 
can be found in the work of Yassin Hafez, 
George Tarabishi and others who clus-
tered around the group Arab Socialism in 
the early 1960s, which later developed 
into what Tareq Ismael, writing in 1976, 
called a New Arab Left (Ismael). This cur-
rent is the intellectual foundation on which 
Bassem Chit built his own commitment. It 
also provided the methodological and 
organisational inspiration for his re-read-
ing of the revolutionary situation in Leba-
non and the Arab world after 2011.
Importantly, the New Left was not just an 
intellectual current but also a political cur-
rent, albeit far from a unified one. Despite 
their different strategic approaches to the 
Palestinian issue, and different accents of 
Marxism, they shared a sentiment that it 
was necessary to break with the past lead-
ership of Arab regimes. The late 1960s and 
early 1970s saw the formation of the Popu-
lar Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) in Palestine, 
the Communist Party-Political Bureau in 
Syria, and the Organisation for Commu-
nist Action in Lebanon. The Arab Marxist 
tradition—at least in the Levant—is strongly 
influenced by the political affiliation of 
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many writers with these groups, and their 
political and military struggles in the Leba-
nese civil war, the Palestinian freedom 
struggle, and the confrontation with the 
Syrian state. This embattled recent history 
has certainly lent credence to the image of 
the intellectual as a rebel. For the New 
Arab Left, Marxism was for a time being 
practiced gun-in-hand.
After the end of the Lebanese civil war, 
the ideological project of Marxism was in 
a global crisis as a result of the fall of the 
Soviet Union, confounded in Lebanon by 
the defeat of the National Movement in 
the civil war. This led to intense soul-
searching in Marxist milieus in Lebanon as 
well as other Arab countries. While some 
maintained a dogmatic Marxism (mostly 
represented by currents around the Leba-
nese Communist Party), many drifted 
towards liberal positions. Faleh Jaber 
(1997) has termed this new landscape 
post-Marxism, meaning social theory that 
draws on the broad family of Marxist 
thought but goes beyond Marxist dog-
mas. Some post-Marxists dismiss the 
claim that Marxism is an infallible scientific 
theory, and some have moved on to theo-
retical pluralism. Thus, some post-Marx-
ists maintain class analysis, while others 
only apply selected elements of the Marx-
ian heritage. In an Arab context, moving 
on to theoretical pluralism after the end of 
the Cold War meant critiquing the lack of 
internal democracy in Arab communism, 
and accommodation with liberalism. This 
accommodation also had the practical 
implication that by the mid-1990s a sig-
nificant proportion of Arab Marxists left 
their party and had become free-floating 
intellectuals (Sing).
Left Melancholia
The soul-searching post-Marxists that 
Jaber and other scholars like Manfred 
Sing (2015) and Suzanne Kassab (2009) 
discuss largely belong to the generation 
of thinkers and activists born in the 1940s, 
1950s and 1960s. Bassem Chit’s genera-
tion of Marxists have grown up with a dif-
ferent outlook. They are at once more glo-
balized and more confused than the 
previous generation, whose struggle was 
firmly rooted in the great questions of lib-
eration and modernization, national inde-
pendence and structural improvement of 
living conditions of the poor. This struggle 
ended in defeat, manifested by neoliberal 
reforms in the 1980s and 1990s as well as 
the breakdown of Arab unity. On the level 
of social mobilization, Arab Marxists lost 
momentum to Islamist groups, which was 
mirrored on the philosophical level by the 
primacy that Arab Marxists put, from the 
1980s onwards, on the notion of ʾaṣāla 
(“cultural rootedness”) as opposed to 
international class identity (Browers). As 
Bassem told me, this experience of dou-
ble or triple defeat “came with the genes” 
for those who grew up in the 1990s. Their 
parents’ generation had run up against 
external enemies and had been divided 
by internal splits, leaving them with severe 
ideological confusion and no immediate 
sense of direction. It was clear to Bassem 
and his leftist peers, therefore, that they 
had to struggle, both in order to assert 
their influence on the national political 
and social scene, and to fight what Jody 
Dean has called the global ‘left melancho-
lia’ that followed from 1989 (Dean).
Dean’s argument, in short, is that the 
exhaustion of global Marxism was emo-
tional, physical and generational, but also 
a more temporary phenomenon than it 
seemed in the 1990s. The much-trum-
peted triumph of liberalism had been pre-
mature, in other words. The new revolu-
tions and mobilization of the 2010s 
combined with the effects of the 2008 
global economic crisis have engendered 
a revival of communist organisation and 
Marxist theory. Left melancholia, for Dean, 
was not just the result of triumphant ideas 
and actors opposing socialism and Marx-
ism, but just as much the outcome of the 
way in which socialists adopted single-
issue politics and identity politics, which 
abandoned the vision of total social trans-
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formation. The strength of the ‘new new 
left’ of the 2010s is that it embraces mul-
tiplicity (and aspects of liberalism), but 
ties them together in a socialist vision for 
change. Bassem shared this view and this 
optimism, but was also, at the time of his 
death, becoming overwhelmed with fear 
that the counter-revolution unleashed by 
revolutionary fervor in the Arab Uprisings 
threatened to destroy the social fabric of 
Arab countries. He struggled with bouts 
of exhaustion and melancholia, the com-
bination of which probably eventually 
killed him. But he also stressed that the 
purported ‘failure of the left’ was not sim-
ply a failure of socialist ideas and Marxist 
theory, but resulted from tactical mistakes 
made by certain people. In his final inter-
view, given just weeks before he died, he 
underlined the need for an end to what 
Fawwaz Traboulsi (Revolution) has called 
“the lacerating self-criticism” of the left. 
The uprisings, Bassem (and Trabloulsi) 
believed, provided an opportunity to 
realize that
History doesn’t make mistakes, it just 
happens. There have been loads of 
mistakes in the traditional left. But 
saying that the new revolutionary 
left could have organized the work-
ing class, to organize itself in the past 
twenty years, this is absurdity. In the 
last twenty years, we are talking about 
a revolutionary left rising in different 
countries, in Egypt, in Lebanon, and 
these groups are effective in a small 
degree but still more effective than tra-
ditional left organizations. So it’s a very 
important development.1
The ‘new new left’
Bassem came to this conviction, that the 
renewal of Arab socialism was possible 
from the bottom-up, through his own per-
sonal trajectory. Like all intellectuals Bas-
sem Chit was shaped by the concerns of 
the recent past as much as by the present. 
Born in 1979, he was part of the “war gen-
eration,” who witnessed the Lebanese civil 
war as children and came of age with 
debates about post-war reconstruction in 
the 1990s. On Lebanon’s university cam-
puses in the mid-1990s, leftist organisa-
tions such as bi-lā ḥudūd (“No Frontiers”, 
AUB), Pablo Neruda (LAU), al-ʿamal 
al-mubāshar (“Direct Action”, Balamand), 
and Tanios Chahine (USJ), provided 
spaces for rethinking leftist engagement 
in an age dominate by the neoliberal pol-
icies of the Hariri governments. It involved, 
as one of its participants remembers, ‘un 
mélange de sociaux-démocrates, de mili-
tants laics [“secularists”], d’écologistes, 
d’internationalistes, de nationalistes 
arabes, de marxistes, de trotskistes, et de 
militants des droits de l’homme.’ (Abi 
Yaghi 41). Seeking to bypass the bureau-
cratic language and institutions of their 
older communist peers, this budding ‘new 
new left’ worked in networks rather than 
parties, and preferred public action over 
engagement with official institutions of 
the state, which they viewed as corrupt.
At the beginning of the 2000s, this ‘new 
new left’ increasingly transformed their 
student engagement and intellectual 
debates into activism. Bassem became 
part of this motley crew of new leftists who 
protested the WTO meeting in Doha in 
2001, organised anti-war demonstrations 
against US-led wars in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, published journals such as al-yasārī 
(“the leftist”) and organised activism on 
many different levels. He was thus an inte-
gral figure in the creation of the Socialist 
Forum (al-muntada al-ishtirākī) in 2010, its 
journal al-manshour, and from 2012 the 
journal al-thawra al-dāʾima (“The Perma-
nent Revolution”), which revolved, and still 
revolves, around a network of revolution-
ary socialist groups in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, 
Egypt and Morocco.
Al-thawra al-dāʾima contains Chit’s most 
elaborate intellectual production, not just 
his own articles but also his editorship and 
his efforts to create a network for the 
renewal of revolutionary socialism in the 
region. He wrote insightfully about racism, 
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the Syrian refugee question, and particu-
larly nationalism and sectarianism. Draw-
ing on Ussama Makdisi’s seminal work on 
the modern roots of the sectarian system, 
Chit believed that sectarianism is a prod-
uct of capitalist relations in Lebanon. He 
believed that the sectarian system was 
linked to hegemony of the ruling class 
established under imperialism and per-
petuated by the liberal institutions of the 
state. In this way, he took Makdisi’s con-
structivist argument further by stressing 
the internal contradictions in the capitalist 
system and the class structure of Lebanon 
(Chit 2009, 2014). From a scholarly point 
of view there is nothing novel in this argu-
ment. It has been elaborated based on 
original research by other historical mate-
rialists such as Fawwaz Traboulsi, Carolyn 
Gates, and Salim Nasr. But then, Bassem 
Chit was not primarily a scholar. For him, 
the important task was to understand the 
conditions of Arab societies and devise a 
plan for revolutionary change. He insisted 
on a class analysis of Lebanese politics 
and society, because he believed that a 
clear, historically founded analysis of the 
complex structures of Lebanese society 
was a necessary starting point for the 
inculcation of revolutionary conscious-
ness. In doing so, he placed himself in a 
long tradition of critiquing sectarianism 
and linking social justice to the formation 
of a secular political order (Haugbolle).
A Nineteenth-Century Rebel in the 
Twenty-First Century
Bassem’s writings and manner of speech 
were deeply influenced by Marx and 
Trotsky. Talking to Bassem could some-
times feel like talking to a nineteenth-cen-
tury revolutionary in London, ready to 
organize and theorise all the way to king-
dom come. He earned the respect of fel-
low revolutionaries from his willingness to 
engage in conversation and debate with 
all sorts of people, from refugees in meth-
odological workshops that he organised 
in some of Beirut’s poorest neighbor-
hoods, to Lebanese and foreign academ-
ics. In all of this, he stuck to his belief in the 
necessity of revolutionary change.
Just like the first socialists in the mid-nine-
teenth century, Arab revolutionary social-
ists today depend on solidarity and com-
radeship in order to maintain the 
momentum of their project to change the 
social order against all odds. Therefore, 
Bassem was very aware of the need to 
unify the ideological line in the Marxist-
socialist milieu. At the time of his death, 
deep splits had occurred that existed prior 
to 2011 but had been accentuated by the 
uprisings and in particular by the war in 
Syria. The splits were already visible in 
2006, when a group of leftist intellectuals 
in Lebanon published an open letter 
denouncing the Democratic Left Move-
ment and the March 14 alliance for their 
failure to protect and support Hizbullah in 
its war with Israel. In 2011, some leftists 
continued to support the Syrian regime in 
the name of the struggle against Israel 
and resistance to imperialism, but this 
position was challenged by the evident 
and growing violence against civilians. 
Others stood with the Free Syrian Army, 
the Syrian National Council and the peace-
ful uprising, in the name of revolution and 
the defense of democratic rights. Some 
supported a middle way between solidar-
ity with the protestors’ demands for free-
dom and rejecting foreign interference, 
and instead advocated national reconcili-
ation (Dot-Pouillard).
As the Syrian crisis intensified and became 
an outright war in 2012, the splits on the 
left in Lebanon and in the region wors-
ened. In May 2013 I asked Bassem to 
explain how he viewed the chances of a 
unified left in the region, to which he 
replied that he thought it was crystalizing, 
but that the war in Syria showed that unity 
would necessitate a complete rupture 
with “the old left,” which to him was only a 
left in name. The old left, for him, meant 
the Stalinism of many Arab communist 
parties, and the authoritarian legacy of 
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Arab socialism in the form of Baathism 
and Nasserism. Their support for the Syr-
ian regime and for Hizbullah was not sur-
prising, as they put collective struggle 
before individual freedom, and anti-impe-
rialism—the notion of mumānaʿa (“rejec-
tionism”)—before popular mobilization 
(Traboulsi, Crisis). Bassem had great belief 
in the ability of his generation to distance 
themselves collectively from the old left in 
a way that the ‘old new left’ in the 1960s 
and 1970s perhaps failed to do. The Arab 
revolutions were to be the tool of this uni-
fication, which would lead to a revolution-
ary culture that could set the Arab coun-
tries on the path of regional redistribution 
of wealth, resistance to foreign interfer-
ence, and socialist states. For the revolu-
tions to become such as tool, the new left 
of the 2000s, he believed, had to join 
forces with the hundreds of thousands of 
Arabs involved in the revolutions. The aim 
of al-thawra al-dāʾima was to theorize rev-
olution with the people involved in the 
uprisings. Tracing the birth of a new left, he 
told me that,
In Lebanon it started in the late 1990s, 
early 2000s. It started with the movement 
against the war in Iraq. In 2002, the move-
ment here in Lebanon adopted the slogan 
“no war, no dictator.” Ironically this is the 
same position we take today on Syria. We 
are against any military intervention, even 
of Hizbullah, and against dictatorship. This 
position started in 2002.
Others became involved already around 
the Palestinian Intifada of 2000-2001. But 
as Bassem said, “that was an easy question 
compared to the Iraqi war.”
In the question of Iraq, some of the left, 
for example what became the Demo-
cratic Left Movement, aligned them-
selves with the imperialists, saying im-
perialism will bring democracy to Iraq. 
Our group started off from the position 
between those who supported Sad-
dam against imperialism and the coali-
tion against tyranny. We came together 
over this position. And so there was a 
fragmentation, and that fragmentation 
has continued... Today [in 2013] the 
DLM is deteriorating. The Lebanese 
Communist Party is deteriorating. This 
is because they have chosen sides. And 
what we see is that our position—of be-
ing in-between, of double-rejection if 
you want—is gaining more momentum.
The position of double-rejection has 
proven to be difficult, if not impossible, in 
the context of continuous civil war as in 
Syria, or authoritarian military rule as in 
Egypt, where the revolutionary socialists 
have been imprisoned and persecuted 
since 2013. For Bassem, the rejection was 
necessary to maintain against all odds. He 
did not see it merely as a practical position 
against particular political forces, but 
equally as the only tenable ideological 
position for any democratic Arab left wor-
thy of its name. Ideologically, he linked this 
stance to the rejection of stagist theory, 
the Marxist theory that underdeveloped 
countries must first pass through a stage 
of capitalism before moving to a socialist 
stage. This necessitates alliances with the 
national bourgeoisie. What might seem 
like a detached abstract discussion was in 
fact the central bone of contention 
between the Arab nationalist movement 
and new left Marxists in the 1960s. Thus, 
Khaled Bakdash, on returning from Mos-
cow in 1951, had suddenly learned the 
Stalinist line of a stagist approach (Tibi 24). 
Today, Bassem stressed, Communist par-
ties and other leftist currents maintain 
stagist theory “as a justification for their 
support for regimes such as the Syrian.”
And this is the same stagist theory that 
led the left in Lebanon to be destroyed! 
That led the left to be destroyed by 
Nasser in Egypt. By Khomeini in Iran. 
All over the region. Can you believe 
it? They are readopting the theory and 
creating illusions about a certain alli-
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ance with the national bourgeoisie. In 
an era when you have a hugely global-
ized economy. And the national bour-
geoisie is linked to the international 
bourgeoisie. This is absurd because 
the line of separation between national 
and international bourgeoisie, which 
may have existed in the nationalist era, 
does not exist anymore. For example, 
when we look at banking, construction, 
et cetera, in Egypt, Tunisia, Lebanon, 
they are directly linked to international 
capital. And they are linked to the mon-
eyed ties of Saudi Arabia extending ev-
erywhere. This is why we think that it is 
a destructive theory.
Remembering Bassem
The last time I spoke with Bassem we 
talked about the sense of living in revolu-
tionary times, where history was replayed 
as farce —both the deep history of interna-
tional socialism and that of the Arab left. 
“It’s like the old ghosts are coming back, 
the good and the ugly but mostly the 
ugly,” he said. We talked about how we 
should all work to improve conditions 
here and now and build networks of soli-
darity. We talked about the importance of 
focusing on local struggles, even if revolu-
tion has to be international. Sadly, it was 
probably his failure to live up to this sound 
advice—his constant engagement in a mil-
lion things at the same time—that got the 
better of his heart. Somebody should 
have said to him, “take it easy, you’re 
doing too much.” Somebody probably 
did, but Bassem wouldn’t have listened. 
He lived the struggle.
The many obituaries published by Leba-
nese, Arab, and international socialists are 
a testimony to his impact on this current. 
He was one of the few people who could 
coordinate and develop regional branches 
of revolutionary socialists. In al-manshour, 
his close colleagues from the Socialist 
Forum wrote that he “dedicated his life to 
the liberation of humanity from all forms 
of hegemony, occupation and oppression. 
With his sudden departure, we lost more 
than a rare revolutionary activist. We also 
lost a unique leader with very creative ini-
tiatives. It will not be easy at all to fill the 
huge vacuum of his absence.”2 The revo-
lutionary socialists in Egypt asserted that 
he “was a towering figure on the Arab rev-
olutionary Left” with a 
“unique ability to coordinate the issu-
ing of a statement on behalf of revo-
lutionary organizations in different 
countries and complete all the neces-
sary discussions and corrections in half 
a day (…) We have lost a tremendous 
fighting spirit. We have lost a keen rev-
olutionary intelligence. We have lost 
the theoretical and political contribu-
tions we were expecting from him in 
the long term.”3
Beyond the region as well, the legacy of 
Bassem was celebrated and the lost 
potential mourned. “It’s hard to overstate 
the political loss the revolutionary left in 
the Middle East has suffered,” wrote Alex 
Callinicos in the UK-based Socialist 
Worker. Remembering Bassem as some-
one who added crucial nuance to interna-
tional socialists’ understanding of the 
complexities of the Middle East, Callinicos 
stressed that a sympathetic “cultural trans-
lator” such as Bassem is highly needed for 
international socialists to make sense of it 
for them.4 Summarising reactions to Bas-
sem’s death, the Moroccan researcher and 
member of the international group RS21 
Miriyam Aouragh further wrote, “we have 
lost one of the very few principled voices 
in what is becoming a quagmire.”5
The Middle East, the left, and popular 
mobilization have landed in a quagmire 
indeed. Perhaps it is worth remembering 
that for every generation of leftists, the 
challenges have been huge and the odds 
stacked against them. The attempt to 
carve out a path towards socialist change 
has always necessitated iconic figures, 
rebel intellectuals, whose words and 
deeds provided guidance. The most 
touching indication that Bassem Chit 
could become such a figurehead for 
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com/interview-with-the-late-
bassem-chit-on-the-politics-
and-culture-in-lebanon-and-
the-middle-east-1302.html> 
 
2 <http://www.al-manshour.
org/node/5923>
3 <http://global.revsoc.
me/2014/10/farewell-bassem-
chit-farewell-comrade/>
4 <https://socialistworker.
co.uk/art/39121/
5 <http://rs21.org.
uk/2014/10/03/bassem-chit/>
Works Cited
Abiyaghi, Marie-Nöelle. 
L’altermondialisme au Liban: 
un militantisme de passage. 
Logiques d’engagement et 
reconfiguration de l’espace 
militant (de gauche) au 
Liban. Doctoral Thesis. Paris: 
Université Paris 1 Panthéon-
Sorbonne, Département de 
science politique, 2013.
Browers, Michaelle. Political 
Ideology in the Arab World. 
Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009. Print.
Chit, Bassem. “Divisions 
confessionnelles et lutte de 
classe au Liban.” Que faire? 
No. 10, Jan./March 2009.
---.“Nationalism, Resistance 
and Revolution.” International 
Socialism 2: 145, Jan. 2014.
Dean, Jonathan. “Radicalism 
Restored? Communism and 
the End of Left Melancholia.” 
Contemporary Political 
Theory (2015) 14, 234-55, 4 
Nov. 2014. Web. 9 Apr. 2016.
Dot-Pouillard, Nicolas. “Syria 
Divides the ArabLeft.” Le 
monde diplomatique (English 
edition), 2012: 4. Web. 9 Apr. 
2016
Gramsci, Antonio. Selections 
from the Prison Notebooks. 
London: Lawrence and 
Wishart. 1971. Print.
Haugbolle, Sune. “Social 
Boundaries and Secularism 
in the Lebanese Left.” 
Mediterranean Politics 18.3 
(2013). Web. 9 Apr. 2016
Havel, Vaclav. Disturbing the 
Peace: A Conversation with 
Karel Hvizdala. New York: 
Vintage Books, 1991. Print.
Tareq Ismael. The Arab 
Left. New York: Syracuse 
University Press, 1976. Print.
Jaber, Faleh (ed.). Post-
Marxism and the Middle East. 
London: Saqi Books, 1997. 
Print.
––›
Sune Haugbolle
An associate Professor in Global Studies, 
Sune Haugbolle is the author of War 
and Memory in Lebanon (2010), co-
editor of The Politics of Violence, Truth 
and Reconciliation in the Arab Middle 
East (2009) and has published widely 
on political culture in the Middle East. 
He currently directs the research group 
Secular Ideology in the Middle East at 
Roskilde University, Denmark  
(www.ruc.dk/sime) and is writing a 
modern history of Arab left movements 
and ideas.
email: suneha@ruc.dk
activists in the Middle East is the fifth 
issue of al-thawra al-dāʾima, where his 
peers from around the Arab world, old 
and young, pay tribute to his thoughts 
and life. These short texts are often quite 
poetic and deeply personal, and show 
the extent to which his death was a col-
lective emotional event, a turning point 
after which no one was the same. As his 
friend Walid Daou wrote, Bassem was not 
quite Christ the Saviour, but his comrades 
now almost feel like the disciples who 
must be reminded by the example of the 
dead to stand against “the attacks that 
are being waged today. Will we be able 
to stand on our feet? The answer is cer-
tain, it is that we will not accept anything 
less than a sweeping revolution to lead us 
towards the other side.”6
Bassem himself formed his ideas in a 
conversation with all of the living people 
on these pages and many more, and with 
his intellectual heroes, as he grew up in 
the 1990s, staring down left melancholia 
with his Trotsky, his Mahdi ‘Amil and his 
Marx in hand. Ideological formation is a 
cumulative process, in which the words 
and deeds of rebels who went before 
provide guidance for new generations. It 
was unexpected that Bassem should join 
their ranks so soon.
CLOSE UP
Middle East – Topics & Arguments #06–2016
74
---. “The Crisis of the Politics 
of Mumana’ah - Statehood 
and Participation.” Heinrich 
Böll Stiftung, Middle East,> 3 
March 2014.Web. 9 Apr. 2016. 
Kassab, Elizabeth Suzanne. 
Contemporary Arab 
Thought: Cultural Critique 
in Comparative Perspective. 
New York: Colombia 
University Press, 2009. Print.
Rodinson, Maxime. Marxisme 
et monde musulman. Paris: 
Éditions du Seuil, 1972. Print.
Sharif, Maher. “From Marxism 
to Liberal Nationalism: A 
Transformation in Palestinian 
Marxism.” In Post-Marxism 
and the Middle East, ed. 
Faleh Jabar. London: Saqi 
Books, 1997. Print.
Sing, Manfred. “Arab 
Post-Marxists after 
Disillusionment: Between 
Liberal Newspeak and 
Revolution Reloaded.” In 
Arab Liberal Thought after 
1967, eds. Meir Hatina and 
Christoph Schumann. New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2015. Print.
Tibi, Bassam. Die arabische 
Linke. Frankfurt/M.: 
Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 
1969. Print.
Traboulsi, Fawwaz. “The 
Left in Time of Revolution”. 
Jadaliyya, 9 Nov. 2012. Web. 9 
Apr. 2016. 
––› 
ISSN: 2196-629X
http://dx.doi.org/10.17192/
meta.2015.6.4090
CLOSE UP
